This paper outlines a putative pathway for experimental psychopathology research developing psychological models of clinical disorders. The pathway uses established external validity criteria to define the pathway and clarifies the important role that research conducted on healthy participants can play in our understanding of clinical disorders. Defining a research pathway for experimental psychopathology in this way has a number of benefits It would (1) make explicit the need to address the external validity of developed models, (2) provide a clear set of criteria that would be required to extend research on healthy individuals to diagnostic populations, and (3) recommend using general psychological knowledge when developing models of psychopathology.
Introduction
In its broadest sense experimental psychopathology is the study of psychopathology processes under highly controlled conditions for the purpose of developing detailed models of how psychopathology is acquired and can be treated.
This research is often carried out on nonhuman animals or on healthy human participants in order to create models of psychopathology that mimic or predict the processes found in individuals diagnosed with mental health problems (e.g. Abramson & Seligman, 1977; Vredenburg, Flett & Krames, 1993) . There is no doubt that experimental psychopathology as a research approach has made significant contributions to understanding psychopathology across many domains, including depression and anxiety (Vervliet & Raes, 2013; Steimer, 2011) , schizophrenia (Jones, Watson & Fone, 2011) , neuropsychiatric disorders (Nestler & Hyman, 2010) , substance abuse and addiction (Lynch, Nicholson, Dance, Morgan & Foley, 2010) , and pharmacological treatments of psychological disorders (van Gestel, Kostrzewa, Adan & Janhunen, 2014) to name just a few. This article will focus on some specific, and perhaps neglected issues in experimental psychopathology that relate most significantly to the development of psychological models of psychopathology. A full understanding of the processes that contribute to mental health problems will require the development of both biological and psychological models of a disorder, and these different explanatory paradigms will complement each other in many ways. For example, both paradigms will reveal details of processes that will need to be accounted for in the models developed in the other paradigm. In addition, the importance of psychological models should not be underestimated, given that such approaches offer a broader perspective than biological models by providing a means of integrating cognitive, behavioural and social factors into unified models of aetiology and intervention (Davey, 2015) .
However, the elaboration of psychological models of psychopathology has often developed chaotically rather than via an accepted and validated research pathway (Davey, 2003) . First, clinical psychology research is frequently driven by clinical experience and the practitioner's need to develop more effective and efficient interventions (Dawes, 1994) . As a result many clinical psychology researchers develop models of disorders that are specific to their own clinical experience, researched in ways that often lack required levels of empirical rigour, and are built around esoteric constructs that do not match simply onto accepted and basic psychological operations related to perception, cognition and action, and in many cases may simply be redescriptions of the symptoms that it is often claimed they explain (Davey, 2003 (Davey, , 2013a .
Second, it is often difficult for experimental psychopathologists developing psychological models to place their research in established clinical psychology and psychiatry journals -especially if their models have been developed on healthy individuals. Given that many relevant journals have a publication requirement that research must be carried out on clinical populations with a diagnostic label, this has not only made it more difficult for experimental psychopathology researchers to find suitable outlets for their research, it also means that such research may become scattered across a wider range of either secondary journals or mainstream psychology journals rather than being published in frontline clinical psychology or psychiatry journals. This is likely to give the erroneous impression that such research does not belong to a body of research that represents a significant and alternative unified approach to understanding psychopathology 1 .
Thirdly, those using experimental psychopathology methods to develop psychological models of psychiatric disorders have often been negligent in ensuring the validity of their research to clinical populations -especially if it is psychopathology-relevant research conducted on healthy individuals. Whilst external validity has been an important issue in other forms of experimental psychopathology (especially using animal models) (e.g. Belzung & Lemoine, 2011; Stewart & Kalueff, 2015) , it has only recently been discussed as a significant issue in the development of psychological models using healthy human participants (Vervliet & Raes, 2013) . In the case of the experimental study of psychological models conducted on healthy individuals, lack of attention to external validity can seriously undermine the value of a piece of experimental psychopathology research. Researchers may need to indicate more clearly where the research fits into a putative research pathway from basic models developed on healthy individuals to researching processes that are proven to be unique to the relevant clinical population -a validation process that has been much more transparent and fully argued in the case of nonhuman animal models of psychopathology (cf. Vervliet & Raes, 2013) Given these background issues in the use of experimental psychopathology to develop psychological models of mental health problems, the main purpose of this article is to suggest a possible research pathway along which the development and application of such models can progress. This would have a number of benefits: it would (1) make explicit the need to address the external validity of developed models, 1 Recent changes in scope to Behaviour Research & Therapy and the launch of Journal of Experimental Psychopathology will improve the available outlets for experimental psychopathology research conducted on healthy individuals.
i.e. to provide a fuller set of arguments as to why experimental psychopathology studies can be generalized to clinical populations and diagnostic categories, (2) provide a clear program of research that would be recommended when extending research on healthy individuals to diagnostic populations, and (3) recommend using general psychological knowledge when developing models of psychopathology.
The External Validity of Psychological Models of Human Psychopathology
When experimental psychopathologists have received a full and proper training in scientific and experimental methods there should be no need to question their empirical skills. What is at issue is the need to apply principles of external validity to that research to justify the relevance of the laboratory studies to the clinical populations to which those developed models are applied. This is not an issue that is specific to experimental psychopathologists developing psychological models of disorders, it is an issue that is highly relevant to all translational research.
Understanding the different forms and types of external validity is a first step to developing a research pathway that will bridge the translational gap, so it is worth looking at some of the forms of external validity that have been postulated as relevant to translational research in general.
External validity criteria vary considerably in their strength and relevance. and whose definitions are adapted to be relevant to the development of psychological models of psychopathology (adapted from Geyer & Markou, 1995; Stewart & Kalueff, 2015; Belzung & Lemoine, 2011; and Vervliet & Raes, 2013 Teasdale & Fogarty, 1979; Hepburn, Barnhofer & Williams, 2006; Grant, Stewart & Birch, 2007) . Alternatively, some researchers have used healthy participants who score high on the relevant psychopathology (e.g. depression) but are at sub-clinical levels (e.g. Vredenburg, Flett & Krames, 1993) .
Predictive validity is the first step to demonstrating that your model and the processes defined within it do have some relevance to the clinical disorder. The requirement here is that your laboratory model predicts behaviour in the disorder. For example, manipulating appraisals of 'inflated responsibility' (the belief that one has power to bring about or prevent crucial negative outcomes) in healthy individuals may be found to have a direct effect on perseverative activities such as compulsive checking (Lopatka & Rachman, 1995; Bouchard, Rheame & Ladouceur, 1999) , and so such a manipulation predicts behaviour found in certain forms of obsessivecompulsive disorder. (Hawksley & Davey, 2010) , experimental studies can then be undertaken to identify whether the variables important in the model are generating depressive rumination in a clinical population (Chan, Davey & Brewin, 2013) . Secondly, the processes relevant to the laboratory model can also be identified in clinical populations through the collection and examination of patient aetiological case histories. For example, a laboratory conditioning model may demonstrate that fear or anxiety elicited by a stimulus (CS) can be generated by a combination of sensory preconditioning (the association of two innocuous but contiguous stimulie.g. a geometric shape presented on a computer screen followed by a nonaversive 60dB 'beep') and a subsequent process which inflates the aversiveness of the second of the two contiguous stimuli (the nominal UCS -such as increasing the loudness of the 'beep' to an aversive 100dB). This UCS inflation then has the effect of generating fear to the first of the associated stimuli (White & Davey, 1989) . This process gives the impression that the fear-eliciting stimulus has never actually been contiguously paired with an aversive UCS. However, a search of relevant case histories in patients explain the aetiology of disorders such as specific phobias and panic disorder (Davey, 1997; Bouton, Mineka & Barlow, 2001) , PTSD (Keane, Zimering & Caddell, 1985) , and substance use disorders (O'Brien, Childress, Ehrman & Robbins, 1998), and to understand therapeutic processes such as the roles of inhibition and extinction during exposure therapy (Craske, Liao, Brown & Vervliet, 2012 Convergent and Discriminant validity are criteria by which a researcher would attempt to demonstrate the degree to which their laboratory model is either similar to or different from other models of the disorder. Convergent validity will be helpful to a researcher when they are attempting to develop a new laboratory model of a disorder and showing that it predicts similar outcomes to more established and proven models.
Discriminant validity is applicable when the researcher is attempting to test between laboratory models to demonstrate that one model has more validity than another. Both types of validity are important in each of these distinct roles.
Finally, diagnostic validity is a criterion described by Vervliet & Raes (2013) as one of particular importance for experimental psychopathologists developing psychological models. have been central to recent cognitive models of paranoia in psychosis (Savulich, Shergill & Yiend, 2012) , but why doesn't everyone 'jump to conclusions' and so consequently develop paranoia? The answer may lie in the fact that jumping to conclusions is significantly related to deficits in cognitive functions such as working memory, verbal memory and cognitive processing speed (Ochoa, Haro, HuertaRamos, Cuevas-Esteban, Stephan-Otto, Usall, Nieto & Brebion, 2014) , and these are deficits that are regularly found during, and even prior to, the onset of psychotic symptoms (Carrion, McLaughlin, Auther, Olsen, Correll & Cornblatt, 2015) , and so will make those individuals vulnerable to the development of paranoia through the model's important process of 'jumping to conclusions'. Another example of diagnostic validity is one from our own lab. We have developed a laboratory model of perseverative worrying (a cardinal diagnostic characteristic of Generalized Anxiety Disorder) based on the mood-as-input model (Davey, 2006; Meeten & Davey, 2011) .
One feature of this model is that worriers use their concurrent mood to evaluate their progress at the worry task, and if they are in a negative mood (which is common in pathological worriers), that negativity informs them that they haven't yet succeeded in dealing with the worry and so must continue worrying. Not everyone is a pathological
worrier, so what is it about pathological worriers that makes them particularly vulnerable to the processes within this model of worry? The answer seems to be that they possess a number of characteristics that make them especially vulnerable to using their negative mood as information during a worry bout, and so are much more likely to perseverate when worrying in a negative mood (Meeten & Davey, 2011 . This sequence of criteria lends itself to the construction of a virtual research pathway for experimental psychopathology in which an initial basic laboratory model is developed in stages using a succession of empirical methodologies to answer the questions posed by each set of more rigorous validity criteria. This research pathway is illustrated in Table 2 . processes to construct models explaining the attentional and interpretational biases that underlie anxious responding). But more commonly, this stage will involve the use of basic experiments under highly controlled conditions for the purpose of identifying causal relations between events. It is the identification of important causal relations using experimental procedures that is one of the defining features of experimental psychopathology, and the detection of causal relations is the very basis of effective theory building. However, experimental procedures are not just useful for detecting causal relations, they can also be used to infer the existence of processes that cannot be directly observed, directly manipulated or directly measured. Inferential methodologies have been a significant feature of experimental psychology over the years, and in particular were an important methodology in the development of cognitive models of animal learning where self-report methods are not an option (Rescorla, 1980; Dickinson, 1980) , and in the construction of models of human memory. Inferential techniques are a useful way of developing models of the cognitive processes that underlie clinical disorders, and some specific examples of how this type of methodology has been used to elucidate cognitive processes in psychopathology include (1) identifying some of the associative processes that underlie learned fear and anxiety (Davey, 1992; White & Davey, 1989; Davey & McKenna, 1989) , (2) Clinical participants can be tested experimentally to determine whether the important variables in the model are relevant in causing or maintaining the significant symptoms (e.g. Chan, Davey & Brewin, 2013) . However, in at least some cases, this approach may be problematic because of the additional distress it may cause to already distressed individuals (e.g. subjecting these individuals to variables that may increase symptoms such as anxiety or depression). Alternative methods include examining case histories for evidence of the processes described by the model in the aetiology of clinical patients (e.g. Davey, de Jong & Tallis, 1993) , or investigating the aetiologies of clinical patients using self-report questionnaires and surveys (e.g. Öst & Hugdahl, 1981; Merckelbach, Arntz & de Jong, 1991 (Garety, Hemsley & Wessely, 1991; Fine, Gardner, Craigie & Gold, 2007; Savulich, Shergill & Yiend, 2012) . This provides some validation for the cognitive model in that jumping to conclusions is a critical variable in the model that is significantly more prominent in the relevant clinical population.
However, as argued below, it may not be necessary to make explicit comparisons between clinical populations and healthy individuals in this final stage -diagnostic validity might also be addressed in other ways.
One example is by comparing healthy individuals with participants who score high on measures of the disorder but are at sub-clinical levels (e.g. Vredenburg, Flett & Krames, 1993) . This approach is likely to be helpful and valid for disorders that are known to be dimensional rather than categorical in nature (Krueger & Piasecki, 2002) , and examples of disorders with known dimensional latent structures include Generalized Anxiety Disorder (Niles, Lebeau, Liao, Glenn & Craske, 2012) ,
Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (Olatunji, Williams, Haslam, Abramowitz & Tolin, 2007) , and at least some psychotic experiences (Johns & van Os, 2001) . The fact that the symptoms of some disorders appear to be dimensional rather than categorical may initially appear contradictory to establishing diagnostic validity by identifying characteristics that specifically define clinical populations and make them differentially vulnerable to the model being tested. But there is no reason to suppose that these differential vulnerability factors are not themselves dimensional. The vulnerability factors themselves may be specific diagnostic identifiers (e.g. in the examples we have used so far, characteristics such as jumping to conclusions, potential to use mood as information, etc.), but once triggered may facilitate symptoms in a non-linear or exponential way.
A second example is to test healthy individuals and to manipulate the critical variables in the model known to cause the disorder so that they approximate the levels of those characteristics in the clinical population. This is only possible, of course, if the researcher has prior knowledge that the clinical population possesses these characteristics, and an example will be provided in the next section.
You can see from this discussion that there is no one single method to conclusively demonstrate diagnostic validity, and it is likely to be a convergent have a formalistic resemblance to the psychopathology (e.g. anxiety/fear learning), and so can be used to determine whether the processes defined by the model predict behaviour in the clinical disorder (e.g. Davey, 1989 Davey, , 1992 Davey, de Jong & Tallis, 1993) . What is relatively unclear in this stage-based model is what would constitute sufficient evidence to be able to move confidently from one stage of the research pathway to the next. There may be no objective criteria by which to judge this, although the potential impact of the model on theory and/or practice may require more or less convincing validity evidence depending on the importance of the research questions being addressed.
It may also be the case that certain types of research could be prioritized at particular stages of the pathway. For example, it may be risky to start at Stage 1 by spending excessive time and funding on research that turns out not to be clinically White & Davey, 1989; Alvarez, Biggs, Chen, Pine & Grillon, 2008; Davey & Matchett, 1994) . At Stage 3, the model should be in a well-developed state that enables the researcher to identify the significant variables that generate the disorder via the model. If these variables represent known characteristics of the clinical population, then the researcher may be able to manipulate these variables in healthy participants and predict outcomes representative of the disorder (providing some evidence for diagnostic validity). For example, the mood-as-input hypothesis of perseverative worrying argues that pathological worriers use their negative mood as information that they have not achieved the goals of their worry and so persevere with their worrying (Meeten & Davey, 2011) . But not everyone in a negative mood perseveres when worrying, so what makes pathological worriers different? A search of the social psychology literature on mood reveals that when people are engaged in a task (such as worrying) they will only use their moods as information under certain conditions (e.g. when they lack expertise in the task, only when they know their mood is relevant to the task in some way, or when they are experiencing high cognitive load) (Schwarz & Clore, 1983; Ottati & Isbell, 1996; Siemer & Reisenzein, 1998) . Interestingly, all these factors are active in individuals identified as pathological worriers. Pathological worriers have poor problem-solving confidence, and so lack confidence in their expertise to deal with the worry problem (Davey, 1994; Laugesen & Dugas, 2000) , are actively attempting to repair negative mood, and so their mood is very relevant to the task (Clark & Isen, 1982) , and anxiety is known to increase cognitive load and reduce working memory capacity, and thus be more likely to render mood relevant as information (Hayes, Hirsch & Mathews, 2008; Eysenck & Calvo, 1992 
Conclusions
Over the past decade there have been many challenges facing the experimental psychopathologist studying psychological models of clinical disorders. These have ranged from clinical research on healthy participants being excluded from clinical journals, to intensive competition for funds with popular alternative explanatory approaches such as neuroscience and genetics (Davey, 2015) . One way in which experimental psychopathology can begin to compete with these alternative approaches is to be very clear about what constitutes valid experimental psychopathology research and the pathway by which such research needs to progress and be validated. This paper outlines a putative pathway for experimental psychopathology research developing psychological models of clinical disorders, and will hopefully encourage researchers to specify in the introduction to their papers the research framework in which their models have been developed and the validation processes they have adopted to justify their models. This will communicate to the broader clinical research community that psychological models derived from experimental psychopathology methodologies are a valid and coherent contribution to understanding and treating mental health problems, and provide a valuable alternative perspective to neuroscience and genetic approaches. Stewart & Kalueff (2015) , Belzung & Lemoine (2011), and Raes (2013) . 
